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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
RUSSELL BOURNE RASBAND, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
CAROL T. RASBAND, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
CASE NO: 87-0081-CA 
Appeal from the Judgment of the District 
Court of Davis County, State of Utah, 
Honorable Rodney S. Page, Judge 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties to this action were married August 20, 
1957, in Salt Lake City, Utah, (Tr. 19, Tr. 220). Four (4) 
children were born as issue of the marriage with all f them 
having obtained the age of 18 and having graduated fr^m high 
school (R. 86). 
The Appellant has worked several jobs in recent years, 
although admittedly only part-time (Tr. 221), but is capable 
of typing 77 words a minute with accuracy of three (3) or 
four (4) mistakes, and is capable of using a dictaphone (Tr. 
261). Since January, 1986, Appellant has not applied for 
any full-time work, but in response to whether or not she 
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was willing to go to work, indicated that she would work 
because she wanted to (Tr. 262). Appellant indicated she 
was willing to go to work once her son, Brian, was in 
college in the fall. (Tr. 262) . The Court made provisions 
accordingly for Respondent to pay to Appellant the sum of 
$800.00 per month alimony for a period of one (1) year, 
thereafter the sum of $700.00 for two (2) years, $500.00 for 
two (2) years, and $350.00 for an additional five (5) years, 
after which it would be reduced to $1.00 per year, allowing 
for payment of alimony over a ten (10) year period WITH THE 
OPTION TO INCREASE THE ALIMONY IF NECESSARY (R. 105). The 
Appellant indicated that she could not seek employment as 
she had transportation problems and could not read for an 
extended period as her glasses were not the correct pre-
scription, and knew that she would need new glasses before 
obtaining employment (Tr. 220 - 222, 228 - 229). The Court 
provided proper transportation i ;the Appellant by awarding 
to her the Pontiac automobile and ordering Plaintiff to have 
the transmission repaired (Tr. 102) . In regards to the 
prescription for new glasses, Plaintiff was awarded alimony 
on-going for at least a ten (10) year period at reducing 
amounts (Tr. 105) . 
The Court determined that Appellant "is capable of 
meaningful employment in the future." (R. 73, 88). 
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From 1977 through 1984 the Respondent was employed as a 
manager of an insurance agency by State Farm Insurance (Tr. 
34) , and in January of 1985 he became an agent himself by 
assuming a retiring agent's accounts (Tr. 33, 34). The 
Respondent changed jobs due to a nervous breakdown in 
December of 1983, and stress in his position as an agency 
manager and has health problems resulting from the breakdown 
consisting of chronic asthma and the need for medication 
three (3) or four (4) times a day and an inhaler every three 
(3) or four (4) hours, including slightly elevated blood 
pressure (Tr. 41, 42). In his new occupation, Respondent 
was grossing approximately $7,000.00 per month from his 
business and the Court found that he was earning $3,809.00 
per month as a net business income (R. 73, 88). 
Throughout the trial, Appellant and Respondent tes-
tified as to miscellaneous items of property and the Court 
ultimately divided both the real and personal property of 
the marital estate in an equitable fashion (R. 102, 103, 
104) . The Appellant was awarded the home of the parties 
subject to the existing mortgage, allowing the Respondent 
from the equity therein $9,992.00 to reimburse him for the 
payment of the family debts plus $5,400.00 to equalize the 
value of the personal property received by the respective 
parties with the balance of the equity to be divided equally 
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between the parties after equally sharing the cost of an 
appraisal (R. 104). 
The attorney for the Appellant stated that his total 
charges for attorney's fees, including the trial and time 
thereafter to finish, amounted to $7,970.00 due to two (2) 
"difficult" areas that had to be taken including that of the 
disability of the child and the business expenses of the 
Respondent (Tr. 291) . The trial Judge specifically found 
that the case before it was not a difficult one from a law 
or fact standpoint and one not requiring extensive discov-
ery. Such a reasonable attorneyfs fee for the Defendant 
would be $3,500.00, $2,500.00 of which she had paid, thereby 
ordering Respondent to pay an additional $1,000.00 for the 
use and benefit of Appellant's attorney. (R. 106) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Appellant Court in reviewing matters in equity 
and more specifically, in a divorce action, will refrain 
from disturbing the findings of the Trial Court unless a 
clear abuse of discretion is shown. 
2. The Trial Court in a sense did award to the 
Appellant permanent alimony, but in a decreasing manner, 
taking into consideration and balancing the financial 
condition and needs of the spouse claiming support, the 
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ability of that spouse to provide sufficient income for 
herself, and the ability of the responding spouse to provide 
the support such that there was not an abuse of discretion 
by the Trial Court in awarding alimony as it did. 
3. The Trial Court did equitably divide the property 
of the parties, both real and personal, in light of the 
needs and circumstances of the parties such that the Trial 
Court did not abuse its discretion in the division. 
4. The Trial Court found that Appellant incurred a 
reasonable attorney's fee of $3,500.00 in litigating this 
action and properly awarded Appellant, after having found 
that $2,500.00 had been paid to her attorney, the remaining 
balance of $1,000.00, meeting the case law and requirements 
of Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-3. 
5. Appellant's appeal is either frivolous or for 
delay entitling Respondent to an award of damages, including 
any reasonable attorney's fee should the Respondent prevail 
pursuant to Rule 33 of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, and in addition, if Respondent's judgment is 
affirmed, costs to be taxed against the Appellant unless 
otherwise awarded pursuant to Rule 34 of the Rules of the 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I, 
THIS COURT WILL NOT DISTURB THE FINDINGS 
OF THE TRIAL COURT UNLESS THERE IS A 
CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN A DIVORCE 
CASE. 
The standard for reviewing matters in equity was 
recently considered by the Utah Supreme Court in J & M 
Construction, Inc., v. Southam, 38 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (Utah 
1986) , wherein the Court held as follows: 
In reviewing matters in equity, this 
Court will reverse the Trial Court only 
when the evidence clearly preponderates 
against the findings below. Although we 
may review that evidence, we are partic-
ularly mindful of the advantaged posi-
tion of the Trial Court to hear, weigh, 
and evaluate the testimony of the 
parties. (Cite omitted) Where the 
evidence may be in conflict, this Court 
will not upset the findings below unless 
the evidence so clearly preponderates 
against them that this Court is con-
vinced that a manifest injustice has 
been done... 
The Court of Appeals of Utah in a recent decision of 
Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669 (Utah App. 1987) held as 
follows: 
This Court will refrain from disturbing 
findings of the Trial Court in a divorce 
action unless a clear abuse of dis-
cretion is shown. (Cite omitted) The 
Trial Court is clearly in the best 
position to weigh the evidence, deter-
mine credibility and arrive at factual 
conclusions... 
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POINT II. 
THE APPELLANT WAS PROPERLY AWARDED 
PERMANENT DECREASING ALIMONY AS WITHIN 
THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE COURT. 
The Appellant cites the Honorable Court to their recent 
decision of Eames v. Eames, 55 Utah Adv. Rep. 49, P.2d 
(Utah 1987) , wherein this Honorable Court cited a recent 
Utah Supreme Court opinion concerning alimony stating that 
the Trial Court must consider the following factors in 
awarding alimony: 
(1) The financial condition and needs of the spouse 
claiming support, 
(2) The ability of that spouse to provide sufficient 
income for him or herself, and 
(3) The ability of the responding spouse to provide 
the support. 
Ean v. Eames, supra, held that the Trial Court had 
carefully and properly considered the above factors and 
found there was no abuse of discretion such that the award 
of alimony would not be disturbed. That case specifically 
dealt with a couple not unlike the parties in the immediate 
case that had been married for a period of 30 years. They 
had three (3) children born to the union, and at the time of 
trial their youngest child was 18 years old and resided with 
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Plaintiff in the family home, such as Brian is residing with 
the Appellant in the family home. In the Eames case the 
Plaintiff, who was the Respondent, was awarded alimony in 
the amount of $450.00 per month as long as the youngest 
child successfully pursued a full-time college education, 
lived in the home, remained single or reached the age of 21 
years, then alimony was reduced to $300.00 per month and 
would remain so until Plaintiff reached the age of 65 years 
at which time the alimony would terminate. The Trial Court 
found that Plaintiff was employed as a department manager 
and clerk for a large store and her gross income was approx-
imately $10,000.00 per year and that she had been employed 
during most of the marriage in unskilled or untrained type 
positions while the Appellant/Defendant was a manufacturing 
engineer with a gross income of approximately $34,000.00 per 
year. The Eames case did fail to provide the present age of 
the Plaintiff that was receiving alimony. 
In the immediate case at hand, the lower Court did 
award to the Appellant alimony of $800.00 per month for a 
period of one (1) year, and $700.00 per month for two (2) 
years, and $500.00 per month for two (2) years, and $350.00 
per month for five (5) years, and then $1.00 per year, 
allowing Appellant the opportunity, should occasion arise, 
for her to petition the Court to increase payment of alimony 
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should there be a substantial change in circumstances 
necessitating her increase in alimony. This in effect 
awarded to the Appellant an entitlement of alimony for the 
rest of her life, or until such time as terminated by law. 
The trial Judge took into consideration the three (3) 
factors alluded to in ,Paffel v. Paffelf 732 P. 2d 96, 100 
(Utah 1986), by considering and weighing the financial 
condition and needs of the spouse, or the Appellant herein, 
by considering the testimony offered regarding the ability 
of the Appellant to provide sufficient income for herself, 
and by balancing that against the ability of the Respondent 
to provide the support. 
Ample testimony was offered by both parties that the 
Appellant was capable of working and in fact had worked 
several part-time jobs during the marriage of the parties. 
Additionally, the Appellant testified that she was capable 
of typing 77 words a minute, was an excellent typist, was 
capable of working with dictaphone machinery and on many 
occasions had assisted the Respondent in his business 
affairs. The only "disabilities" which Appellant testified 
to were her failure to have worked full-time, difficulties 
in transportation, and with her glasses. The District Court 
in its findings awarded to the Appellant the Pontiac automo-
bile with the order that Respondent repair the transmission 
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of that automobile to resolve her difficulties in transpor 
tation, and did award a substantial amount of alimony 
initially to the Appellant which would allow her to purchase 
proper glasses through a new prescription. Otherwise 
Appellant appeared as found by the District Court to be 
"capable of meaningful employment in the future". 
The Respondent testified and presented Exhibits, and 
the Court found that the Respondent's income was approxi-
mately $3,800.00 per month before taxes, and also found that 
the needs of the Appellant were between $1,250.00 and 
$1,400.00 per month. The Court having established the needs 
of the Appellant and that she was fully capable of meaning-
ful employment based on the testimony of the parties, did 
then divide the property of the parties and finally and 
ultimately did award to the Appellant the alimony now sought 
to be overturned. 
Appellant refers the Court to the ah Supreme Court 
Case of Higley v. Higley, 676 P.2d 379 (Utah 1983), by 
implying that the District Court has failed to grant a sum 
consistent with the life-style of the parties and it has 
thereby violated the direction of the Supreme Court in this 
case. The Defendant and Plaintiff in this case were married 
for a period of 30 years and Defendant was awarded alimony 
in the amount of $100.00 a month which was found to be an 
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abuse of the discretion of the Trial Court. This case can 
be clearly distinguished from the immediate case at hand in 
that the trial Judge in Higley failed to make any findings 
as to the Defendant's ability to work, especially in light 
of the Defendant's health problems which would greatly 
restrict her employability. The Defendant was in poor 
physical health having had an operation for pyloric 
gastrectomy and hiatal hernia which necessitated the removal 
of three-fourths of her stomach. Defendant therein had also 
had a hysterectomy due to hemorrhaging and potassium shock/ 
and finally underwent an operation to remove blockage and 
rebuild the outlet to her stomach. Eighteen days later 
another operation for intestinal blockage was performed and 
at the time of the trial she was in need of further surgery 
for blockage to rebuild the outlet to her stomach. In the 
immediate case at hand, the trial Judge did find specifical-
ly that the ppellant was able to work and there was no real 
evidence or a finding that Appellant's ability to work was 
hindered by any health problems. 
The Appellant refers the Honorable Court to Jones v. 
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), indicating that the Trial 
Court erred in awarding declining alimony in the face of a 
long-term marriage where the wife had no work or education 
producing an expectancy of self-support. That case dealt 
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specifically with the three (3) standards previously men-
tioned as guidelines for determining alimony and found that 
the Court had failed to apply those guidelines. This case 
can be distinguished on the ability of the party paying 
support wherein the Court has as follows: 
The apportionment of income between 
personal and business uses is quite 
properly a matter left to the discretion 
of the husband as owner of the pharmacy 
and gift shop. However, how he chooses 
to allocate that profit is not binding 
on the Court in determining his ability 
to pay alimony to his ex-spouse. The 
full profit produced by the business, 
adjusted by the Court to take into 
account legitimate reasonable needs of 
the business for additional capital, 
should have been used as the basis for 
assessing the husband's ability to 
provide for his spouse. In making this 
analysis, the Trial Court should not 
permit all claims of need for capital on 
the part of the business to take prece-
dence over the support needs of the 
wife. If these capital needs are a 
result of discretionary decisions of the 
husband to expand and improve the 
business, rather than to maintain it in 
its present condition, then to permit 
him to divert income into the business 
at the expense of his ex-spouse fs 
support needs would be to permit him to 
enrich himself at her expense. 
In the immediate case at hand, the Trial Court specif-
ically found that the Respondent had a pre-tax income of 
$3,800.00 which was used for living expenses such that the 
Respondent was not using sums to expand and improve his 
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business, but was maintaining the business in its present 
condition such that the Trial Court did take into consid-
eration in the immediate case at hand all three (3) guide-
lines in making a determination as to declining alimony. 
In the case of Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 
1984), the Court specifically found as follows: 
While the alimony award was far below 
the total amount required to maintain 
the wife at the standard of living she 
enjoyed during the marriage, it is 
reasonable in light of the limited 
family resources available to fulfill 
her needs. Thus, we find no abuse of 
discretion... The Court did find, 
however, that at termination of alimony 
after two (2) years was a clear and 
prejudicial abuse of discretion. 
In the immediate case at hand, the trial Judge did not 
grant two (2) years of alimony with termination thereafter, 
but granted decreasing alimony over a period of ten (10) 
years with a provision of alimony to continue at the rate of 
$1.00 per year allowing the wife to "petition the irt for 
modification of the amount of alimony under the court's 
continuing jurisdiction". Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 567 
(Utah 1985), distinguishing the immediate case from Olson v. 
Olson. 
The instant case does fall clearly within the artic-
ulated guidelines for alimony as awarded by the trial Judge 
established by the Utah Supreme Court and applied by this 
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Court in Eames v. Eames, supra. The trial Judge did consid-
er those three (3) guidelines and determined that the needs 
of the receiving spouse coupled with her apparent ability to 
work and the ability of the paying spouse to pay entitled 
Appellant to a decreasing award of alimony with a provision 
after ten (10) years which would allow her to increase said 
alimony should there be a substantial change in 
circumstances which in effect awarded permanent alimony 
unless terminated by law. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID EQUITABLY DIVIDE THE 
PROPERTY OF THE PARTIES, BOTH REAL AND 
PERSONAL• 
As the Appellant points out in her Brief, the Utah 
Supreme Court held in Alexander v. Alexander, 56 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 31 (Utah 1987) : 
As loi as a property division is made 
within -che standards set by this Court, 
we will not disturb the trial Judge's 
decision. (Cites omitted) This Court 
endows the court's adjustment of the 
financial interests of the parties with 
a presumption of validity and does not 
review their values absent a clear abuse 
of discretion... We do not lightly 
disturb property divisions made by the 
Trial Court and uphold its decision 
except where to do so would work a 
manifest injustice or inequity. 
The Appellant would have this Honorable Court believe 
that a manifest injustice or an inequity has been worked by 
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the trial Judge when the home was awarded to the Defendant 
as she requested subject to the existing mortgage thereof. 
Testimony was offered by the Respondent and the Appellant 
with varying figures as to the actual value of the home, but 
the value of the subject property was between $100,000.00 to 
$125,000.00, with a lien thereon of $52,000.00, leaving a 
substantial equity which is to be divided between the 
parties upon the occurring of one of several events. 
Appellant upon cross-examination was questioned as to 
her use of such a large home when only herself and Shelley 
were present to which the Appellant responded she would not 
need a home that large but would proably rent the home out 
to help her with an income. 
The Appellant places a great deal of emphasis on the 
fact that she has an adult child living with her which is an 
increased burden when at the same time Appellant has been 
awarded the amount of $250.00 for the adult child to assist 
her in this additional expense which is in addition to the 
on-going alimony. 
The Trial Court did carry out the primary mandate of 
MacDonald v. MacDonald, 1236 P.2d 1066 (Utah 1951), in 
making a division of the property and income so that the 
parties could readjust their lives to their new situation as 
well as possible. The Appellant was awarded the home 
-15-
subject to a lien in the Respondent, allowing Appellant time 
to adjust to the new situation. 
In Pope v. Pope, 589 P.2d 572 (Utah 1978), the Utah 
Supreme Court found that the Trial Court did award to the 
Defendant 35% of the marital property and 65% of the marital 
property to the Plaintiff when taking into consideration the 
obligation of Plaintiff to pay the marital debts. The Court 
found this division to be equitable in that the Defendant 
was awarded the income producing assets of the marriage, he 
had two (2) college degrees, several years experience in 
operating his business and a reasonably assured future of 
earning some profits from his business activities. This 
case is distinguished from the immediate case in that the 
Plaintiff, who had no college education, was unemployed at 
the time of trial, was not awarded alimony and was only 
given $135.00 per month for each child's support, where in 
the immediate case at hand the Appellant has been awardea 
substantial decreasing alimony without a termination date 
and $250.00 per month for an adult child's support. 
In the case of Turner v. Turner, 649 P. 2d 6 (Utah 
1982) , the Supreme Court held as follows: 
There is no fixed rule or formula for 
the distribution of a marital estate... 
In Henderson v. Henderson, 576 P.2d 1289 (Utah 1978), 
the Utah Supreme Court felt that with "the concomitant 
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obligation to solely provide for the children" supported an 
approximate two-thirds, one-third division of the property 
and persuaded the Court as being a reasonable and not 
inequitable solution to a most difficult domestic problem. 
In Henderson the mother had basically abandoned or neglected 
her home and family in favor of the pursuit of employment, a 
Master's Degree, and a career which had ultimately led her 
to a responsible and highly enumerative position in the 
field of nursing and also ultimately resulted in the award 
of the five (5) children of the marriage to the Plaintiff, 
Plaintiff having, as stated above, the sole obligation to 
provide for the children. In the immediate case at hand, 
the Appellant has a responsibility of an adult child for 
which the Respondent has been ordered to pay the sum of 
$250.00 per month as and for child support, clearly distin-
guishing the instant case from Henderson such that an 
equitable division in this cast ould be an equal division 
of marital property. 
In Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1980), it is 
proposed by Appellant to indicate the equity of an award of 
two-thirds of family property to the wife and one-third to 
the husband, or 55% to the wife and 45% to the husband. In 
Kerr, it was undisputed that the Plaintiff had contributed 
$10,000.00 from her own separate funds to completely furnish 
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the first home of the parties, and when that home was sold 
and their current home was purchased, many of those furnish-
ings were moved to and were still in the new residence. It 
was further found that the Plaintiff had contributed another 
$5,000.00 of her own funds in 1967 to retire the mortgage on 
the residence. The Court found that in view of these 
undisputed facts, the Trial Court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in awarding the greater portion of the marital 
property to the Plaintiff than to the Defendant. In the 
instant case, the facts are quite to the contrary. Ample 
evidence is given of an inheritance received by the Respon-
dent which was co-mingled with family funds to pay bills and 
other miscellaneous items, yet the Court found it equitable 
to make an equal division of the marital assets. The Trial 
Court finding of fact number 10 in Yelderman v. Yelderman, 
669 P.2d 406 (Utah 1983), states: 
Some of the objectives of the Court in 
arriving at a fair division are to 
accomplish a division of the properties 
as nearly as practicable on an equal 
basis based upon the court's determina-
tion of fair market values in taking 
into account the assumption of marital 
debt... 
The Court in that case in trying to achieve its objec-
tive of as nearly as practicable a division on an equal 
basis, ended up with a division of 56% and 44%, indicating, 
not as the Appellant proposes, that the Court was awarding 
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more to one party than to the other, but quite to the 
contrary, that the Court was trying to effect as equal a 
basis as possible based on the fair market values and taking 
into account the assumption of marital debt which is exactly 
what the trial Judge has done in the instant case. 
Respondent fully understands that the Court is entitled 
to make an equitable distribution of the marital assets of 
the parties, taking into consideration the 15 factors 
involved in the case of MacDonald v. MacDonald, supra, which 
could result in an unequal division, but as the Appellant 
admits, each of the cases which allowed an unequal but 
equitable division as noted by Respondent involved specific 
and distinguishing facts, allowing an unequal division of 
marital assets to be considered an equitable one, all of 
which are distinguishable from the instant case. In this 
case the trial Judge took into consideration the 15 factors 
after ample and extensive testimony and effected a division 
of the property which was equal and equitable with varying 
factors. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID AWARD REASONABLE 
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON BEHALF OF THE APPEL-
LANT. 
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The Trial Court ruled that this was a simple case which 
should have been prepared and tried for $3,500.00. It 
further determined that since the Appellant had raised 
$2,500.00 of this amount, only $1,000.00 needed to be paid 
by the Respondent. The Utah Supreme Court did rule in Kerr 
v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1980), that a Court in a 
divorce proceeding is empowered to award attorney's fees 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-3, and that that 
award and the amount rests primarily with the sound dis-
cretion of the Trial Court based on evidence of need and 
reasonableness as with an award of alimony. 
As stated in Appellant's Brief, the Court does take 
into consideration in considering a requested award, take 
into consideration the attorney's background of learning and 
experience, his ability, his integrity, his dedication to 
the causes with which he identifies himself, also his 
reputation, the nature and importance oi le matter, and the 
amount of money or value of property involved. The more 
recent case of Beals v. Beals, 682 P.2d 862 (Utah 1984), 
reaffirmed this section of the Utah Code by indicating that 
in divorce cases an award of attorney's fees must be sup-
ported by evidence which shows that the requested award is 
reasonable and which establishes the financial need of the 
party requesting the award; relevant factors of 
-20-
reasonableness include the necessity of the number of hours 
dedicated, the reasonableness of the rate charged in light 
of the difficulty of the case, and the result accomplished, 
and the rates commonly charged for divorce cases in the 
community. The even more recent case of Cabrera v. 
Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622 (Utah 1985), held: 
Reasonable attorney's fees are not 
measured by what an attorney actually 
bills, nor is the number of hours spent 
on the case determinative in computing 
fees. In determining the reasonableness 
of attorney's fees, the trial Judge may 
take into account the provision in the 
Code of Professional Responsibility 
which specifies the elements that should 
be considered in setting reasonable 
attorney's fees. The Utah Code of 
Professional Responsibility E.R. 2-106. 
The Court may consider, among other 
factors, the difficulty of the litiga-
tion, the efficiency of the attorneys in 
presenting the case, the reasonableness 
of the number of hours spent on the 
case, the fee customarily charged in the 
locality for similar services, the 
amour. involved in the case and the 
resu obtained, and the expertise and 
experience of the attorneys involved. 
In the immediate case at hand, counsel for the Appel-
lant did testify that he specializes in his practice in the 
area of family law, and testified that he felt that there 
were particular problems faced in this case such as hidden 
income, permanent dependence of a child and the need for 
permanent alimony. He further testified that while his 
billing rate was above the going rate in the community, he 
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thought the charges were reasonable because of the particu-
lar problems presented by the case as presented in the 
foregoing sentence. The attorney for the Appellant also 
testified that he had utilized the services of a legal 
assistant to reduce the charges incurred and believes that 
those too were reasonable and should be awarded. 
In regards to the award of services of a legal assis-
tant, the Appellant and her attorney cite the Court to 
Continental Townhouses East v. Brockbank, 733 P. 2d 1120 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1987). In this case the Court of Appeals of 
Arizona in interpreting a statute of Arizona held that the 
trial Judge is not required to, but may consider, the value 
of services rendered in a case by legal assistants, law 
clerks and paralegals, applying the same standards as are 
used in evaluating lawyers time. This is only persuasive 
authority and is not binding as precedence on this Court, 
nor was it alluded to in the Trial Court. The trial Judge 
specifically stated on the record in response to Appellant's 
attorney's statement "Those were matters that were handled 
by me and that I bring her to trial to assist her in witness 
management and exhibit management as follows: We have a 
bailiff that primarily handles both of those things and so 
if you want to bring one that's, you are welcome to do that, 
Mr. Dolowitz, but I can tell you right off that it's not the 
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Court's intent to allow you to receive credit for that and 
the computation of legal fees in these matters." (Tr. 293) 
The trial Judge found after taking this matter under 
advisement and based on the specific testimony of the 
Appellant's attorney in regards to the factors to be con-
sidered in Kerr v. Kerr, supra, Beals v. Beals, supra, and 
Cabrera, that the case before the Court was not a difficult 
one from the law or fact standpoint, and one not requiring 
an extensive discovery such that a reasonable attorney's fee 
for the Defendant would be $3,500.00, $2,500.00 of which she 
had paid from monies acquired during the course of the 
marriage, leaving a balance owing of $1,000.00 to the 
Defendant from Plaintiff for the use and benefit of her 
attorney, which is clearly within the discretion of the 
Court after reviewing the testimony of the Appellant's 
attorney as to the reasonableness of the fee, those factors 
involved therein and the needs of the Appellant. 
POINT V 
IF THE APPELLANT'S APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS 
OR FOR DELAY, RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO 
DAMAGES INCLUDING REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S 
FEES, AND IF THE JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED, 
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO COSTS AGAINST 
THE APPELLANT. 
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The Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, Rule 33, 
entitle damages for delay or frivolous appeal state as 
follows: 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous 
appeal. If the Court determines that a 
motion made or an appeal taken under 
these Rules is either frivolous or for 
delay, it shall award just damages and 
single or double costs, including 
reasonable attorney's fees, to the 
prevailing party. 
Should the Court determine that the Appellant's appeal is 
either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages 
and single or double costs, including reasonable attorney's 
fees, to the Respondent. 
Rule 34 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals 
entitle award of costs, states: 
(a) To whom allowed. Except as other-
wise provided by law, if an appeal is 
dismissed, costs shall be taxed against 
the Appellant unless otherwise agreed by 
the parties or ordered by the Court; if 
a judgment order is affirmed, costs 
shall be taxed against the Appellant 
unless otherwise ordered. 
Should Appellant's appeal be dismissed or Respondent's 
judgment affirmed costs should be taxed against the Appel-
lant unless otherwise ordered. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Appellant seeks reversal of the Trial Court's 
Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law and ultimate Decree of 
Divorce by requesting that this Court set aside a decreasing 
award of alimony, by awarding the marital home to the 
Appellant and by awarding the attorney's fees requested by 
the Appellant's attorney. All three of these matters are 
within the discretion of the trial Judge and can only be 
reviewed and overturned or set aside by by this Court if 
there has been a clear abuse of the trial Judge's dis-
cretion. A review of the Case Law presented by Appellant 
and as distinguished by the Respondent indicates that the 
Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in any of the three 
(3) matters, but did take under consideration the three (3) 
guidelines in awarding decreasing alimony, the guidelines in 
awarding an equitable and equal division of the marital 
property, and the guidelines in awarding a reasonable 
attorney's fee of $3,500.00, $2,500.00 of which had already 
been paid as found by the Court. 
WHEREFORE, the Trial Court having complied with the 
mandates of this Court, Respondent requests that the Appel-
lant's appeal be dismissed, nothing awarded thereby, and 
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that the Respondent be awarded costs and his attorney's fees 
in responding to this action. 
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